Slashing cover sized to your own staked position: up to 20% of what you have with Everstake, minus a 1% deductible, at a fixed 1% per year. Who buys it, the operator or the staker, is not stated.
Everstake is one of the larger non-custodial staking providers: founded in 2018, active across dozens of proof-of-stake networks, with institutional certifications and no material slashing event on its own record. Nexus lists an ETH Slashing Umbrella Cover for it, priced at a fixed 1% per year, at the low end of the slashing family. The annex works in ratios rather than fixed sums: a deductible of 1% of the cover amount, and a maximum cover of 20% of the covered member AUM. It also does not name the buyer, which leaves the central question open. This analysis reads the annex and checks the fit. Facts, not advice.
Who this is for: Whoever holds stake with Everstake and buys this: the annex ties the cover to the buyer AUM, so it protects the staked position rather than a third party
Structurally the most sensible of the slashing covers, and at the same time the one whose beneficiary is least clear. The proportional design is its strength: a deductible of 1% of the cover amount and a ceiling of 20% of AUM scale with the position instead of sitting at an arbitrary fixed number, so the cover does not become meaningless as the stake grows, the way a fixed ceiling does. The 1% annual price sits at the low end of the family, above only the Ether.fi umbrella at 0.75%, and is plausible against an operator with a long clean slashing record and institutional certifications. The open question is who the covered member is. The annex says a covered member may buy up to 20% of their AUM, which reads like the party whose stake is at risk, and that could be the operator covering delegated stake or an institution covering its own. Nexus classifies the listing in the umbrella family that normally sits at operator level, but the annex alone does not settle it. Until that is answered, treat this as cover for the staked position of whoever bought it, and do not assume a delegator is protected without confirmation.
How to read this page: where each value comes from
Only on-chain values are verifiable without trusting anyone. Everything off-chain, including binding documents, ultimately relies on trust in the source.
Reading the chain…
Percentages instead of fixed sums, and that is the interesting part: Every other slashing cover in this set fixes its limits in absolute numbers, which quietly erodes them: a $5,000,000 ceiling covers a smaller and smaller share as the staked base grows, and a 5,000 ETH deductible becomes easier or harder to breach with the ETH price. This annex avoids that by tying both ends to the position: the deductible is 1% of what was bought, the maximum is 20% of assets under management. The cover therefore keeps the same shape as the stake changes. The price of that elegance is that nothing here is knowable from outside. You cannot compute what is protected without knowing the buyer AUM, and the annex does not say who the buyer is. A well-designed cover whose beneficiary you cannot verify is exactly the case where a broker should ask before a staker assumes.
The umbrella cover plus annex, applied to Everstake. The covered event is a slashing loss; the 1% deductible and the 20%-of-AUM ceiling shape where it reaches.
Pick what you actually want protection from; the list below highlights your answer. Runs in your browser only, nothing is sent.
Even "covered" is not a payment guarantee: every claim is decided by the mutual's members (claims assessors). A risk not listed here is most likely not part of the wording at all. No advice.
Pick your risks above and only those appear here, with the verdict: covered or not.
Same core process as every Nexus claim: the Claims Committee and assessor voting decide. No Everstake slashing claim is on record, which is consistent with the operator reporting no material slashing event since inception. Evidencing a claim here would require showing both the slashing loss and the AUM the 20% ceiling is measured against.
A structured assessment across seven categories, 0 to 100 points in total. The score is an opinion based on the sources below, not a probability of payout and not a guarantee.
Note: this product is bought by a protocol team, not by end users. We therefore score it with our team rubric, which asks the questions a team asks. The most important one: if disaster strikes, does the money actually reach the users? Compare this score only with other team products, not with the retail list.
The premium is the underwriters price verdict: mainly how likely a claim is. The Assecura score measures how good the cover is: fit, clarity, capital, claims. Where they diverge, look twice.
The mechanics are clean and proportional, and the annex is public and short. The deduction is substantial and specific: it never says who the covered member is, so the single most important question about a team cover, who is protected, cannot be answered from the document.
Same shared pool as the provider profile, on-chain verifiable, live above. The proportional ceiling means the maximum exposure is bounded by the buyer position rather than open-ended, which is easier for the pool to carry than a large fixed umbrella.
Provider process applies, and a slashing loss on Ethereum is comparatively easy to evidence on-chain. Minus: untested, no annex-level claims-assistance commitment, and the AUM-based ceiling adds a second fact that must be proven at claim time.
The builder question: does the payout reach the people whose stake was slashed? Here it is genuinely unresolved. If the operator holds the cover, delegators benefit; if a single institution holds it, they do not. No pass-through obligation is visible in the annex, and unlike Native Protocol Cover there is no clause 10.12 equivalent to enforce one. Scored on what can be verified, not on what is likely.
Nexus side unchanged. Operator side: the slashing risk depends on Everstake infrastructure and key management, which is externally certified (SOC 2 Type II, ISO/IEC 27001) rather than self-asserted, and the long record without a material slashing event is a real signal.
Discretionary cover, no enforceable claim: identical in substance to the provider profile.
The annex is public, which is better than nothing, but it is the least informative of the three: a delegator reading it cannot tell whether they are behind the cover, how much is covered, or whether any cover is currently in force, because every limit references a private AUM figure.
The beneficiary is not named: the annex says "a Covered Member" and sizes the cover off their AUM, so a delegator cannot verify from the document that they are protected.
Payout remains discretionary: the loss is decided by assessor voting, so the provider-level warning applies unchanged.
Nothing outside can be computed: every limit is a percentage of a private number, so no on-chain figure shows how much stake is actually protected.
Ceiling at 20% of AUM: a truly catastrophic slashing event would exceed it, and the excess falls back on the staked position.
Single-pool capacity: this listing is restricted to one Nexus staking pool, so the counterparty side is concentrated rather than spread.
Not retail: private and fixed-price. A delegator cannot buy this listing themselves.
Points this analysis could not verify. Anyone buying significant cover should clarify these first.
Analysis as of 2026-07-19. Live figures update every 5 minutes from the contracts. Not affiliated with Slashing Umbrella Cover: Everstake. Informational only, no legal, investment or insurance advice.